

DIVING SAFETY LINES



NAVSAFECOM EXPEDITIONARY AND SPECIAL WARFARE
DIVING SAFETY NEWSLETTER

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From the Naval Safety Command Diving Officer CWO4 Christopher "Timmy" Timothy

Deep Sea,

Greetings from the Naval Safety Command (NAVSAFECOM). I am CWO4 Chris Timothy and I reported onboard in July after a very rewarding tour as the Training Officer at Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two. I have been on active duty since 1993 (27 years active) and my duty stations include USS Mt Hood (AE 29), Naval Cargo Handling Battalion Unit Four, Southeast Regional Maintenance Center, USS Salvor (ARS 52), SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Detachment Everett, Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Two.

I would like to thank my predecessor, CWO5 (ret.) Jim Nabors, for all the hard work he put in while he was at NAVSAFECOM. Your efforts to ensure risk management is a culture in Navy diving is reflected by the significant decrease in diving-related mishaps in the fleet.

Your leadership will be missed, but we wish you fair winds and following seas as you enter the next phase of your life and career.

I am very excited to be stationed here, as it gives me the opportunity to travel around the world observing all the great work you are accomplishing daily, and to see the tremendous efforts you put into executing inherently dangerous operations as safely as humanly possible. During my short time onboard I have been on five assessments, and I have been blown away with the preparedness and professionalism I have seen throughout the fleet. I look forward to seeing everyone on future assessments.

You are going to see a lot of introductory articles in this issue of Diving Safety Lines because there was a large staff turnover in the past six to eight months. Welcome aboard NDC Clint Self, NDC Matt Greiner, DVC Jeremy Speedy (USCG) and last, but certainly not least, NDCM Ryan Ilagan. They will introduce

themselves later in this issue and explain their roles and responsibilities here at NAVSAFECOM, and I am excited and lucky to work with them as they are true diving professionals.

I would also like to send a special shoutout to ITN2 Leonel Rodriguez onboard USS Santa Fe (SSN 763). Petty Officer Rodriguez reached out to us recently and asked us to highlight the great things the men and women in our submarine diving force are accomplishing and we are happy to accommodate that request. We have seen tremendous engagement and enthusiasm at the squadron and submarine level regarding the submarine diving program, and they have come a long way bringing their program up to speed. Hoo-Yah Petty Officer Rodriguez! Thank you for your continued interest and engagement. We look forward to highlighting all the wonderful work our submarine diving force is doing and the safe way they are completing these very important missions.

Until next time, everyone stay safe out there!

DSA Scheduler's Corner

By DVC Clinton Self

Hello all. For those of you out there that I have never met, my name is NDC Clinton Self. I checked in here at the Naval Safety Command (NAVSAFECOM) in June. Seeing familiar faces during the six assessments I've been a part of felt like a mini-recall each time.

Prior to onboarding here, I was stationed at Ship Repair Facility Yokosuka, Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One, Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two, Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center, and Naval Special Warfare Logistics and Support Unit Two. Coming up in this community has been amazing and I am looking forward to meeting the new generation of divers, as well as seeing some old

friends. My role here at NAVSAFECOM will be scheduling.

One thing to keep in mind when scheduling your DSA is early planning. We budget the best we can based on your command's last assessment, however, the key scheduling factor is when you have completed your last Diving Operational Readiness Inspection (DORI). Per OPNAVINST 3150.27D, your DSA window is 15-21 months from the command's last DORI. Additionally, if a DSA has not been accomplished within prescribed limits, the DORI interval must not exceed 21 months. Part of what we need to schedule you will be your most recent DORI letter.

I'm looking forward to working with you all and please reach out if you have any questions or are ready to schedule your DSA.

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Doc's Corner: Year in Review and Looking Ahead

By HMCN Andrew Taylor

It is clear the operational tempo for our diving community was both steady and demanding through FY-25. Over the past year I've been a part of 22 safety assessments conducted across the fleet, reflecting the commitment to maintaining the highest standards of readiness and safety in our operations. The diving fleet is performing at a very high standard and I am very proud to be a part of this community. Looking forward, the upcoming FY promises to be just as busy with preparations already underway for another cycle of assessments following a brief pause in the schedule.

Leadership and Oversight in RMI and Quality Control

A key transition is taking place within our Risk Management Information (RMI) reporting system and Quality Control (QC) processes. NDC Matt Greiner will assume responsibility

as lead for all RMI and QC matters. His leadership will provide continuity and focus in these critical areas, ensuring our assessments remain thorough, consistent and aligned with safety standards. Please don't hesitate to reach out when entering mishap reports and investigations into RMI. Communication with us here can save time and prevent QC rejections for everyone.

Medical Readiness and Compliance

On the medical side, recent evaluations have highlighted a recurring issue: several commands continue to operate without the required Maintenance Index Page (MIP) 5921-700, which governs dive side first aid kits and hazardous material lockers. Commands are strongly reminded to submit a feedback report to have this MIP added to their work centers in SKED. Ensuring compliance with this requirement is

essential to maintaining medical readiness and protecting the health and safety of personnel in diving operations.

Recognition and Closing Thoughts

During every assessment, one constant stands out—the dedication and professionalism of Sailors on the deckplates. The effort and pride demonstrated across the fleet are both impressive and encouraging. As the new year approaches, I urge everyone to continue striving for excellence, to remain vigilant and, most importantly, to stay safe.

Bravo Zulu to the fleet for your hard work this year, let's carry that momentum forward.



RMI Manager's Corner

By NDC Matt Greiner


Hello to my Deep Sea family, both new and seasoned! I am NDC Matt Greiner, and I checked onboard the Naval Safety Command in July. I'm privileged to join this exemplary team and I look forward to the opportunity to serve our exceptional community in this role. I've been a diver since 2010, with assignments including Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two, Naval Submarine Support Facility, Naval Submarine School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Six, and most recently, Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One.

Before becoming a diver, I spent my first seven years in the Navy as a Damage Controlman aboard USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), and USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). This diverse background has given me a strong foundation and appreciation for teamwork and safety at every level.

As I step into the role of Risk Management Information (RMI) manager for the Expeditionary and Special Warfare Directorate,

I will be the point of contact for all the RMI and the Dive Jump Reporting System programs. If you have any questions about submitting mishaps or need help navigating diving-related issues, please don't hesitate to reach out. I look forward to working closely with all of you to support and strengthen our diving community.

Dive Safe and Hoo-yah Deep Sea!



Hospital Corpsman Second Class Ethan Bobick, a dive medical technician assigned to Naval Aerospace Medical Institute Hyperbarics, treats a simulated patient from inside a hyperbaric chamber during a joint Army and Navy pressure injury exercise, Aug. 28. The Navy Medicine Operational Training Command (NMOTC) is the Navy's leader in operational medicine and trains specialty providers for aviation, surface, submarine, expeditionary, and special operations communities. With five detachments, 12 training centers, and facilities in over 60 locations across the United States, NMOTC provides high impact individual medical training for the Navy, other U.S. armed forces and allied nations around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Russell Lindsey SW/AW)

DIVING SAFETY LINES

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Safety Management System

By Brett Husbeck, Diving Safety Program Division Head

Deep Sea,

I would like to touch on the Navy Safety Management System (SMS). Most of you might be asking yourself why he is talking about SMS to divers? It's because we are incorporating SMS into Diving Safety Assessments (DSA). Hopefully, by the end of this article that hits the wave tops, you will understand why assessments are an important part of the SMS.

The SMS structure aligns with ISO 45001, which is the international standard for occupational health and safety management systems. This standard ensures we're using globally recognized best practices. It promotes consistency and credibility across our safety processes and allows for better collaboration with industry partners and contractors who also follow ISO standards. ISO 45001 is all about creating a safe and healthy workplace by managing risks, improving processes and involving leadership and workers at all levels. The standard is built around **PDCA – Plan Do, Check, and Act** – a proven model for continuous improvement. Let's break it down briefly:

Plan – Identify risks, set safety objectives and create policies and procedures.

Do – Implement those plans by training people, applying controls and using the system in daily operations.

Check – Monitor performance and assess whether goals are being met.

Act – Make improvements based on what's working and what's not. This is where we adjust, correct and refine. This cycle keeps the system active and evolving, not something static or checked off a list.

This structure gives us a reliable and repeatable way to manage risks and to get better at it over time.

Safe to Operate/Operate Safely



- **Safe-to-Operate.** Standard – Work as imagined. Design, policy, engineering, resourcing and expectation management from SYSCOM or ISIC that sets the safety risk envelope

- **Operating Safely.** Execution – Work as performed. The execution of the mission within the designed safety envelope. If not achievable, communicate risk, apply appropriate controls/accept at right level.

The aim is an effective Safety Management System/Risk Control System (SMS/RCS) that avoids unnecessary harm to people or damage to equipment across the entire scope of Navy activities. Avoiding unnecessary loss is paramount to maintaining the readiness of our force and preserving our nation's assets. The SMS does this through a formal, top-down and bottom-up methodology to ensure and assure we are Safe-to-Operate and Operating Safely resulting in Safe People, Safe Place, Safe Property/Materiel and Safe Processes/Procedures (otherwise known as the 4Ps).

The 4Ps:

- **Safe Place.** Safe workplace or working environment from a benign office environment through high-risk operational environments. Ensure emergency protocols and systems are operable and tested regularly.
- **Safe People.** People and their supervisors are trained and qualified in all aspects of conducting their work properly and are experienced, proficient, current, procedurally compliant, risk-aware and fit to work (general health and wellbeing).
- **Safe Property/Materiel.** Proper and available tools, equipment, machinery, infrastructure and whole equipment systems that are Safe to Operate and Operating Safely.

- **Safe Processes/Procedures.** Proper and accessible standard operating procedures, emergency procedures, safety procedures, maintenance standards, etc.

The goal of the SMS is to prevent accidents before they happen and enable the team to respond properly when risks arise. When the 4Ps are in place and working together, we create an environment where we are Safe to Operate and always Operating Safely. Nobody in their right mind goes into work and doesn't want everything running as designed. Below are the two sides of the safety equation.

Safe to Operate Example – A MRC has vague information leaving gaps in exact steps to be taken for maintaining a MK 16. Was this maintenance process safe to operate? No, incomplete information can lead personnel to inadvertently take an incorrect step in the process resulting in damage to equipment or injury to personnel.

Operating Safely Example – A diver omitted decompression stops during the ascent resulting in decompression sickness. Was the diver operating safely? No, he did not follow procedures which require decompression stops on the ascent. The key is finding out where the disconnect happened and providing a lasting fix for it. Asking the 5-Whys is a great way to get to this answer.

Safety Management System (cont.)

Next let's talk about the SMS Risk Resilience Model. This model gives us a system-wide view of how we manage risks, not just to avoid mishaps, but to build resilience in how we operate.

On the left side of the graphic below, we see the preventative controls that aim to support desired outcomes (the 4Ps) by reducing the chance of incidents or catching errors early. No single control should fail alone; multiple layers of protection (defense-in-depth) work together to manage risk.

We know things can still go wrong. That's why the right side is so important. It represents our response and recovery mechanisms from detection and for leadership intervention and team resilience designed to limit the impact when things do break down. The goal isn't zero risk. It's to ensure we're prepared to operate effectively and recover quickly when risks materialize. That's what resilience means in practice. In short: good systems prevent problems; great systems recover from them. The Navy's SMS is built to do both. This isn't the Swiss cheese model that oversimplifies the process. Navy operations are complex. We deal with systems, not just widgets. This model reflects a full-system approach using engineering

controls and oversight from higher echelons to manage risks across the board. The 4Ps (People, Place, Property and Process) apply to both prevention and recovery, reinforcing resilience isn't just stopping bad things from happening, but being ready to respond when they do. The center is labeled 'Issue' because the same system principles apply to any kind of risk (safety, operational, environmental) with this model. This represents a paradigm shift in the Navy: we're no longer focused only on prevention. Take the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), could arson have been prevented? Maybe. What we know is this, the total loss of a ship could have been avoided if recovery and response systems had functioned as intended. That's what this model captures, the resilience before and after the incident.

Next, we are going to touch on assurance. What is assurance? Assurance is about providing justified confidence our systems are working as intended. That's where Safe to Operate and Operating Safely comes into play. It's more than an inspection; it's a leadership responsibility to continuously check, verify and improve using internal and external assessments. Assurance spans 1st, 2nd and 3rd party assessments. These assessments act as checks and balances, providing feedback loops to identify and correct deviations. Let's go over

what the 1st, 2nd and 3rd party assessments cover.

1st Party Self-Assessment (e.g., personal accountability, dive locker assessments, leadership-by-walking-around, etc.)


- Foundational level involves continuous self-monitoring
- Daily commitment to following procedures, recognizing risks and hazards and taking corrective actions
- First line of defense against deviations

2nd Party Senior-to-Junior Assessments (e.g., ISIC DORI)

- Oversight and mentorship
- Higher echelon commands assess subordinate units to verify adherence to standards, identify weaknesses and provide guidance
- Reinforces proper practices and correct deviations before they escalate

3rd Party External Assessments (e.g., NAVSAFECOM DSA)

- Provide an independent, objective evaluation of the entire system
- Verify compliance with regulations and standards, identify systemic issues and offer recommendations for improvement
- Offers a broader perspective, often uncovering hidden deviations or weakness in both "Safe to Operate" and "Operating Safely"



There you have it, the Safety Management System in a nutshell. The success and overall safety of the system is dependent on the effectiveness of addressing latent causal factors influencing the Sailor decision environment, which directly influences behavior. Equally important is the efficacy of 1st and 2nd party assessment efforts. If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact me.

Master Diver's Corner

By NDCM K. Ryan Ilagan

Hafa adai DEEP SEA!

NDCM K. Ryan Ilagan here, and I just reported to Naval Safety Command this August. A little bit about me, I joined the Navy in 2003 as a Postal Clerk with my first command on the USS Frank Cable (AS -40). I found my calling working with divers on the ship and submitted my package to become a Navy diver.



Graduated Second Class Dive school at NDSTC in 2007 (07-50-2C) and was assigned to Seal Delivery Vehicle Team Two (SDVT-2). SDVT-2 was by far my favorite command, conducting Dry Deck Shelter operations on nuclear powered submarines ... EPIC!



I continued my career at Southwest Regional Maintenance Center from 2010-2013, where I spent most of my time on Alpha Crew conducting repairs on CVNs completing numerous Planned Incremental Availabilities and Compressed Incremental Availabilities at North Island. I also assisted Charlie crew with some work on submarines during my time there. We bonded so well we became known as Ch-Alpha Crew.

Shortly after I attended First Class Dive school (13-60-2C) I was assigned to Undersea Rescue Command, San Diego California, from 2013-2016. I learned more about salvage and rigging than I experienced at Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two (MDSU Two). A different culture but ultimately a rewarding command. I achieved some prestigious accolades during that tenure and made NDC.



I arrived at MDSU Two in July of 2016, completed a training cycle, and deployed on the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) to provide RCC support for Carrier Air Wing One. I was promoted to Senior Chief and attended Master Diver Evaluations (20-20-MDV). I was then assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Expeditionary Support Unit One (EODESU One).

I completed 15 months there, then returned to my passion of salvage and doing the "grind" for another tour at MDSU Two.

I completed two training cycles with MDS Company 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4. I went on two CENTCOM deployments with MDS Company 2-4 and 2-5. I was then promoted to Master Chief and transferred to U.S. Naval Base Guam.

My tour in Guam was eye opening. I observed many diving-related treatments across the full spectrum of the Dive Manual. Additionally, the dive locker had a huge impact supporting port operations due to its strategic location in the Pacific. This is a locker worth going to after multiple arduous deployments.

Finally, I arrived at Naval Safety Command in August 2025. I relieved NDCM Russ Ciardello, who retired, and completed my first assessment where I observed how to conduct business. I truly appreciate all the effort the commands put into preparing and executing the DSAs. Additionally, I enjoyed the time to catch up with old friends. The most rewarding part is seeing young divers I've mentored, grow up through the ranks and assume more demanding roles.

The current DSA team has been great to work with. Although the majority are new, they are seasoned experts in their craft. You'll see their introductions in this newsletter. I look forward to completing more assessments, catching up with friends and understanding the scope of every command's missions. Dive Safe!!

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The Coastie Corner

By DVC Jeremy Speedy

Change of Coast Guard Rep

Greetings, I am DVC Jeremy Speedy. Of my 19 years in the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), I've spent 13 of those as a diver after going through initial Navy Dive Training in 2012 (12-40-2C). I started at the Regional Dive Locker East in Portsmouth, where I kept a travel bag continuously packed for five years before heading to Regional Dive Locker West in San Diego. During the four years spent there I returned to Naval Dive and Salvage Training Center for more dive training (19-40-1C). I continued on to the underwater egress dunker in Elizabeth City before arriving at Naval Safety Command. There are only a handful of dive units in the Coast Guard, but the travel is plentiful. It has taken me places I never thought I'd get to see on my own.

Just about the time these safety lines are released we'll be plowing right along into Coast Guard Dive's next round of DORI inspections. This time it will include the Coast Guard's newly acquired recompression chambers. This year marks one of the Coast Guard dive rate's biggest milestones in expanding its capabilities with these chambers. Keeping up with a new capability and ever-expanding workload, this also comes with adding 17 new billets to the dive rate. Every bit helps with a rating of just 70 people. Mind you, in a service smaller than the

whole New York Police Department, adding 17 billets to one of the Coast Guard's smallest rates cannot be understated in its importance. Implementing these chambers into our rate was years in the making. Laying the groundwork to bring them into operation, Coast Guard divers congregated at the Pacific dive locker for a rigorous and comprehensive training period where the initial qualifications of operator, inside tender and chamber supervisor were awarded accordingly. Loaded with these new qualifications, Coast Guard divers wasted no time folding them into the mission set. Earlier this year during the buoy tender round up in Alaska, Coast Guard dive provided its own primary chamber and qualified support team, an asset previously required to be provided by the Army. Ready for a voyage into the Antarctic Circle right now aboard the USCG Cutter Polar Star, a Coast Guard Transportable Recompression Chamber System is loaded as the primary chamber. Riding along, Coast Guard divers will provide polar diving support during the Polar Star's arduous ice-breaking mission. This used to be provided by a Navy chamber team.

The Coast Guard's only emergency egress training dunker staffed by Coast Guard divers who provide high-risk egress training to aviation students and boat forces is located at USCG Aviation Technical Training Center


(ATTC). Even following all necessary and required precautions, we know the risk of a diving-related injury is always present. Should such an injury occur, ATTC divers will now have the luxury of having their primary chamber within their own building improving diver and student safety.

Measuring the magnitude and accomplishment with the continued momentum of these milestone achievements grows exponentially every day by your continued dedication. Doing it right and doing it well, keep it up! My line of communication is always open. A great advantage to our small rate is having anywhere from 75-100% of everyone's personal phone numbers in our contact list.

In closing, I must give a shout out. This coming year could see the pinning of the very first modern-day Coast Guard Master Diver. Hoo-yah Tommy! Best of luck!



The Naval Safety Command Phone App
NOW AVAILABLE for
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) devices



Consolidated Diving Safety Assessment Results

ADMINISTRATION

AD01

The command diving instruction was missing guidance for Commander's Critical Information Requirements and breath hold dives as required by OPNAVINST 3150.27D.

AD04

There is no effective means of ensuring divers stay up to date with the latest Diving Advisories. Most recent available was from 2022.

AD05

There is no effective means of ensuring divers stay up to date with the latest Diving Safety Lines. Most recent available was from 2018.

AD12

All divers did not conduct the required eight dives annually.

AD17

Tag-out entry log listed incorrect number of tags for an active Tag-Out Record Sheet.
Numerous tag-out violations to include missing signatures on the tag-out record sheet and missing signatures on the red tags for second person verification.

AD19

Local Re-Entry Control procedures are out of date.

AIR SYSTEMS & STOWAGE

AS02

Command was missing second Operator signature and Diving Supervisor signatures on completed Operating Procedure.

AS05

FADS III had interconnecting air system hoses that were single bagged with foreign material exclusion (FME) covers. The FME covers were torn exposing the ends of the hoses. The hose end that was exposed contained verdigris.

AS09

FADS III was missing the required system safety air supply tags.

AS22

FADS III umbilicals were missing the required pнемofathometer hydrostatic test tags.

AS23

Umbilical did not have a proper FME cover on the end of the umbilical to prevent contamination.

AS30

High pressure oxygen hose on the Oxygen Regulator Control Assembly had the outer protective covering chafed through to inner hose.

AS35

Spare relief valves were not listed in SKED.
ADS III components were not listed as individual line items in SKED.

COMPRESSOR

CP02

Air sample was not documented in SKED or the unit's external maintenance tracker.

CP02

Bauer compressors had multiple SKED errors with incorrect anchor dates across multiple applicable PMS requirements.

CP03

Bauer compressors' filter housings were missing the required tag information IAW the MRC.

CP04

Bauer compressor's moisture separators were missing the required tag information IAW the MRC.

CP05

All logbooks assessed were missing various required data (missing start/stop, corrective maintenance completed and pressures out of parameters).

The compressor logbook was missing the required corrective or preventive maintenance accomplished, component being charged, and pressures out of parameters entries.

CP06

Air samples Bauer compressors were not tracked for completion in SKED work center and were overdue.
The command's most recent air sample failed air purity standards.

CP07

Gauges on the Bauer compressor had conflicting data between the sticker, SKED and OQE. The OQE was off by one year compared to the information

in SKED and on the sticker. The gauges on Bauer Capitano compressors 2071 and 2073 were calibrated at 24 months instead of the required 18-month intervals.

CP08

All relief valves on five Bauer compressors were expired.

CP10

The OP and emergency procedures EP for the command's five compressors were not available.

CP11

The OPs for the command's five compressors were not posted.

CP18

The unit had one charging whip with loose whipping on the strain relief.

CP20

Bauer compressor had a pool of oily residue under the electric motor.

CP26

Compressor gauge anchored in SKED for December 2023. The calibration date on the gauge is September 2023.

DIVE BOAT

DB19

Maintenance check 120M-1 Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) was not completed.

DIVE PANEL (DP) 2

DP08

The calibration sticker on the unit's portable pressure gauge was incorrectly labeled to expire at 24 months instead of 18 months.

DP25

The unit had two buoyancy compensators with fresh water in the bladders.

DP29

Work center used the 18M-5R in SKED for comparative accuracy on the pressure gauge. The correct maintenance check listed should be the 18M-2R.

Consolidated Diving Safety Assessment Results (cont.)

HAZMAT

HAZ10

Eyewash station has not been inspected since 2022.

KM97

SS30

Four torque wrenches had expired calibration.

SS13

One KM 97 neck dam had six small holes in the neoprene.

SS02

Checklists required for preoperational checks on the KM 97 were not properly filled out.

MEDICAL

MD01

The unit had two divers with expired diving physicals.

MD02

The unit had one diver with a pending waiver.

MD12

Quarterly maintenance check on the O2 cylinder was not documented on the control tag or SKED. The last documented recording was 2022

MD14

Backboard had a broken buckle.

MD09

Expired consumables and medicines found in two first aid kits.

MD08

Epinephrine and Diphenhydramine found in the first aid kit were expired.

MK25

MK2537

Loose whipping on the charging whip from the electric booster pump to the charging station.

ORM

ORM03

The designated senior enlisted ORM assistant had not attended the required training for the position.

ORM02

Command did not have a senior enlisted ORM assistant designated in writing.

RECOMPRESSION CHAMBER

RC02

Chamber logbook was missing multiple signatures from the Master Diver and/or the Diving Officer.

RC30

Expired consumables were found in medical kits.

RC31

No quarterly inventories were documented in SKED since 2022.

RC39

The components of three recompression chambers were not listed or tracked in SKED properly.

RC38

Built-in Breathing System situational requirements were not documented for three recompression chambers in SKED.

RC25

Sound-powered phone was inoperable.

RC28

Face of gauge had several cracks.
Chamber Air and Oxygen Supply hose improperly connected causing an abrasion through the outer shell of the hose.

SCUBA

SC03

One set of twin 3000 psi SCUBA cylinders had a 5500 psi blowout discs installed. Maximum allowable blowout disc for 3000 psi cylinders is 5000 psi.
Three sets of twin 3442 psi SCUBA cylinders had the incorrect blowout discs installed. The maximum blowout disc for the 3442 psi SCUBA bottle is 5150 psi. The command had 5500 psi blowout discs installed.

SC10

The SCUBA regulator set's low-pressure buoyancy compensator inflation hose was kinked.

SC13

Three buoyancy compensators had saltwater in the bladders.

SC22

Pressure pot was stored with the bayonet off, missing a gauge, missing a relief valve, and found to contain debris. Command stated pressure pot was in IEM but it was not.

SC25

The regulator sets, which contain two second stage regulators, are listed on one single line item in SKED work center. This setup only allows tracking of maintenance for one of the two regulators.

All gauges, relief valves, flasks, filters, SCUBA regulators, SCUBA cylinders and hoses were not identified or tracked in SKED on single line items.

SC26

Dates for submersible gauges were incorrectly anchored seven months late in SKED.

SCUBA cylinder hydrostatic test dates were anchored late in SKED.

TRAINING

TRA07

No long or short range training plan in place.

TRA08

No diver's training plan in place.

TRA09

No HAZMAT training conducted.

TRA11

Diving Officer was the only diver signing the training attendance records.

No records of attendance kept for completed training.

UNDERWATER CUTTING & WELDING

UCW19

A-2R on welder was overdue by eight months.



Want more?

Check out our resources and publications: **Approach**, **MECH**, **Ground Warrior** magazines, surface and aviation safety newsletters, Safety Awareness products and more!

Naval Safety Command, located on Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, provides resources and guidance to develop a Navy safety culture in which everyone is trained and motivated to manage risk and ensure the combat readiness of our forces and the Navy's global warfighting capabilities.

We provide policy, doctrine and guidance, safety surveys and assessment visits, training and education, multimedia products, marketing and outreach campaigns, and recognition and awards programs.

Our products, current and archived, can be found at <https://www.navalcommand.navy.mil>.



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Find our latest issues of **Approach**, **MECH** and **Ground Warrior**. Our family of publications is available online at <https://navalsafetycommand.navy.mil/Media/Mags-Pubs/>.

The editorial staff is always looking for contributing writers. We want to publish your articles and stories that increase operational readiness, evaluate safety and health issues, correct deficiencies, and emphasize situational awareness.



Feedback or ideas for the next DIVING Safety newsletter issue?



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