SPRING/SUMMER 2026

DIVING SAFETY LINES

NAVSAFECOM EXPEDITIONARY AND SPECIAL WARFARE DIVING SAFETY NEWSLETTER

U.S. Navy divers, attached to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group (EODGRU) 1, approach the Artemis II crew module to recover the crew after returning from their lunar mission April 10, 2026. NASA's Artemis II mission sent four astronauts on a flight around the moon in the Orion space capsule, marking the first time humans journeyed to deep space in over 50 years. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Rowe)

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From the Naval Safety Command Diving Officer

CWO4 Christopher "Timmy" Timothy

Deep Sea,

As the great Ron Burgundy once said, "Boy, that escalated quickly." It seems my time at the Naval Safety Command is coming to an end after just under a year. I have the privilege of relieving my good friend, CWO5 Jason Potts, at U.S. Fleet Forces Command, allowing him to enjoy a well-deserved retirement.

While I am both saddened and disappointed to leave the Safety Command, I am excited to take on a new role at Fleet Forces, where I will advocate for Navy Diving at the four-star level. My relief, the highly capable CWO3 Ryan Foster, will be joining us from Training and Evaluation Unit Two. You will be seeing him out on assessments in the coming months - welcome to the team, Ryan!

Grading criteria are frequently discussed during our assessment process. We strive to be transparent throughout our time onboard, answering any questions you or your chain of command may have about how discrepancies are weighted. Factors include whether discrepancies are self-identified, significant, repeat or SKED errors. Significant and repeat discrepancies carry greater weight than self-reported or SKED errors.

These grades are then compared against a Fleet average, giving insight into your command's performance relative to other dive-capable units. Just as you continuously self-assess in the Fleet, we at the Safety Command perform ongoing self-assessments to ensure we provide fair and accurate evaluations. Adjustments are made as needed and your feedback is always welcome. Please do not hesitate to reach out—via phone, email, chat, text, or even carrier pigeon or telegraph—with any questions or suggestions so we can present the most accurate picture of your diving programs.

The photo at the right was taken during a recent assessment at the Third Reconnaissance Battalion in Okinawa, Japan. Master Diver Cerecer provided familiarization training on jet boots. While they are neither powered by actual jet engines nor are they truly boots, they were incredibly fun to use. After a brief moment of panic, I adjusted to the equipment and soon felt like Iron Man gliding through the water—a sight that mildly impressed my youngest daughter when I told her about it.

During this trip, I also had the pleasure of reconnecting with an old teammate from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU) Two, ND1 Jerimiah Driggers. Catching up and reminiscing about past training cycles and deployments reminded me of a principle I instilled in my team during our training cycles—the Three T's of Navy Diving. I would like to share them with you in this parting article, Operational Excellence: The Three T's of Navy Diving

Trust - Trust your equipment, your team, and your training.
Technique - Mastery of diving skills and procedures.
Tenacity - Perserverance under challenging conditions.



Until next time, everyone stay safe out there!

Diving Safety Assessment Scheduler's Corner

By DVC Clinton Self

Happy 2026 Deep Sea. With Spring and Summer Diving Safety Assessment (DSA) schedules tightening up, please communicate your preferred availability as soon as possible. The key factor is when you have completed your last Diving Operational Readiness Inspection (DORI). Per OPNAVINST 3150.27D your DSA window is 15-21 months from the commands last DORI. Additionally, if a DSA has not been accomplished within prescribed limits, the DORI interval must not exceed 21 months. We will need your most recent DORI letter to schedule you.

It's never too early to schedule your DSA requirements. Looking forward to working with you all and please reach out if you have any questions or are ready to schedule your DSA. Contact me via E-mail: Clinton.h.self2.mil@us.navy.mil, or Cell/WhatsApp/Signal: (808) 397-7625.

Equipment Operator 1st Class Devon Maher, U.S. Navy Seabee Diver assigned to Underwater Construction Team (UCT) One, Construction Dive Detachment Bravo (CDD/B), conduct ice-diving operations during a bilateral ice diving exchange with Estonian Rescue Board and Estonian Navy divers at Rummu Quarry Lake, Feb. 10, 2026. The annual exercise enhances cold-weather diving proficiency and maritime readiness in the Baltic Sea region. UCT 1, CDD/B, currently deployed under 22nd Naval Construction Regiment (22 NCR), is a specially trained and equipped unit within Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces that specializes in diving, light salvage, underwater construction and military engineering operations in austere environments. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Petty Officer Justin Stumberg)

Doc's Corner: Farewell

By HMCM Andrew "Bud" Taylor

As I prepare to transfer from the Naval Safety Command, I would like to take a moment to reflect on what has truly been an incredibly rewarding tour. Serving alongside this community, both within Naval Safety Command and across the Naval Enterprise, has been one of the highlights of my career.

Throughout my time here, I have had the opportunity to observe and engage with diving commands across the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. I have consistently been impressed by the professionalism, technical expertise and dedication demonstrated at every level. The Naval Enterprise's commitment to mission readiness and diver safety is evident in the way you train, maintain your equipment and execute operations. Most importantly, it is reflected in the way you look out for one another.

As I move on, my message is simple. Stay engaged, stay disciplined and continue to hold yourselves and your shipmates to the highest standards. The work you do is inherently high-risk and it demands constant vigilance. Continue to take ownership of your programs, learn from discrepancies and never lose sight of the fundamentals keeping our divers safe.

I am confident the community will continue to thrive under the leadership of my relief, HMCS Matt Reagan. He brings a wealth of experience and a strong commitment to this mission. I ask that you extend to him the same level of professionalism, trust and support you have consistently shown me.

I will be transferring to Naval Medical Forces Development Command at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. While I may be moving on from this position, I remain committed to this community and am always available if you need anything. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me directly with any questions or concerns.

Thank you for everything you do each day to keep our divers safe and our mission moving forward. It has been an honor to serve with you.

Hooyah Deep Sea!

RMI Manager's Corner

By NDC Matt Greiner

Deep Sea,
As the Navy continues to modernize safety reporting across the Fleet, we want to highlight important changes to the Risk Management Information (RMI) system and what they mean for the Navy diving community. These updates are part of a larger effort to improve how we report, track and analyze risk. Our goal is to better protect our divers and ensure mission readiness.

RMI is now the single program of record for all safety-related reporting. Per the U.S. Navy Diving Manual, Ch. 5 guidance, all mishaps, hazards, near misses and incidents must be reported, recorded and analyzed within RMI. The use of any system other than RMI is no longer authorized. RMI also includes inspection data, hazard tracking, medical surveillance and other safety program information which may have previously been maintained in separate systems.

For the diving community, this means more emphasis on timely, accurate and complete reporting. Near misses, unsafe conditions and procedural deviations that may have gone undocumented before must now be captured in RMI. These data points are critical for detecting trends, mitigating risk and minimizing future mishaps. If it impacts safety, it belongs in RMI.



U.S. Navy Divers, assigned to Task Group 73.6/Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1 - Company 3, recover divers from water aboard Safeguard-class rescue and salvage ship USNS Salvor (T-ARS-52), during a recovery mission with the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, in Subic Bay, Philippines, April 14, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Moises Sandoval)

As divers, most of us should already have appropriate RMI access. Commands should ensure all required personnel have accounts established and understand their roles in the reporting process. If you are experiencing issues with access or system functionality, support is available through the Navy Enterprise Service Desk where users can submit tickets and chat with agents. You can also reach out to me with any questions you may have.

Additionally, formal RMI training courses are available online. These courses provide instruction on system use, data entry requirements and reporting best practices. Upon completion, training is documented in Fleet Training Management and Planning System. This ensures personnel maintain proper qualifications. Even if you have used RMI extensively, all diving supervisors, safety personnel and leadership are encouraged to take advantage of this training. It will help you understand all the new features.

As with any major system change, leadership engagement is critical. Commanding officers, officers in charge and diving supervisors must monitor compliance closely. They must also highlight the importance of reporting. RMI is more than a way to document and track our dives. It is a key part of our risk management framework.

This transition marks a major step in how we manage safety across Navy diving operations. Using RMI correctly helps us keep the highest standards of safety and readiness.
Stay safe, stay engaged and keep reporting.

Hooyah Deep Sea.

Understanding the Updated DSA Grading Criteria

By Brett Husbeck, Diving Safety Program Division Head

There have been ongoing discussions regarding the Naval Safety Command's (NAVSAFECOM) grading methodology for Diving Safety Assessments (DSA), specifically concerning the self-assessment component. The following will clarify the current evaluation process, the rationale behind the continuous improvement, and how scores are calculated. The primary objective of a DSA is not punitive. It is a third party assessment from an entity outside your CoC that looks for the same safety and readiness issues that would typically surface during the Safety Management System's (SMS) 1st party self-assessments and 2nd party ISIC inspections, ultimately enhancing the safety and effectiveness of our diving community.

In calendar year 2025, NAVSAFECOM conducted 37 DSAs. The results showed strong performance across the fleet:

Overall DSA Grade: 20 commands scored "Above Average," 16 "Average," and one "Significantly Below Average."
Self-Assessment Grade: 11 commands scored "Above Average," 23 "Average," and three "Below Average.

These results indicate a commendable commitment to safety in military diving operations.

Evolution of the Self-Assessment Grading System

The previous self-assessment format had a significant flaw. A command would receive a full one-point deduction for an entire inspection area (e.g., KM-37, MK-16, or SCUBA) if a single discrepancy was found that had not been self-reported. This system applied the same penalty for one minor issue as it did for ten, failing to distinguish between varying levels of compliance.
The new system addresses this by implementing a more nuanced, percentage-based approach.

How the New System Works:

Percentage-Based Scoring: Each inspection area is evaluated as a percentage. For example, if three air compressor checklists contain 30-line items each (for a total of 90 items) and inspectors find four discrepancies, the command's score for that area would be 95.5% (86 out of 90 correct).

Incentivizing Self-Reporting: The system now rewards commands for honestly identifying and documenting their own shortfalls. If, in the same example, the command had self-reported two of those discrepancies and documented a clear path forward for correction, their score would increase to 97.7%. This model encourages commands to "get real and get better" by fostering a culture of proactive self-correction.

Averaged Final Score: The percentages from all inspection areas are averaged together to determine the final self-assessment score.

Key Factors Affecting the Final Score

While proactive self-assessment is rewarded, certain high-level discrepancies will significantly impact a command's final grade.

The score will be lowered under the following conditions:

Discrepancy: **Grade Impact**
Significant Discrepancy: Drops one full grade for each significant discrepancy.
Repeat Discrepancy: Drops a half grade for each repeat discrepancy.

It is important to note that significant or repeat discrepancies that were not identified or corrected since the last DORI or DSA are expected to carry more weight in the final score.

Safety Management System (SMS) Exception:

A new adjustment has been made regarding repeat discrepancies. If a command cannot obtain the funding or resources to fix a known issue and has properly documented it within their SMS, the discrepancy will not be counted as a repeat discrepancy against their final self-assessment score. However, it will still be displayed as a repeat discrepancy on the DSA report. We want to capture the repeat discrepancy that is not resolved from the previous inspections.

In conclusion, NAVSAFECOM will continue to use the four-tier grading scale (Above Average, Average, Below Average, and Significantly Below Average) for both the overall DSA score and the command's ability to self-assess its diving program. It is not uncommon for a command to receive an "Average" on the final DSA score while earning a "Below Average" on the self-assessment portion. This disparity typically highlights a need for more rigorous and honest internal review.

Dive and Jump Reporting System Updates

The changes to the Risk Management Information (RMI) system, specifically Dive Jump Reporting System (DJRS), will be implemented over the next quarter. A significant update is every command must now include the latest completed Diving Safety Assessment (DSA) and Diving Operational Readiness Inspection (DORI) dates in the system. After this change is enforced, dive logs will no longer be approved unless the DSA and DORI dates are updated in DJRS.

The good news is: updating your commands DSA & DORI dates is only a few easy steps away.

Step 1. Under Dive and Jump Log, scroll down and open DJRS UNITS



Step 2. Input command's UIC or the Unit name.



Step 3. Once the command populates, click on the edit icon

Step 4. Update the DSA & DORI blocks with your units' latest inspection dates, then hit save.



That is all it takes to update the RMI system, allowing your command to continue approving its dive logs. If you encounter any issues or need further assistance, please don't hesitate to reach out. There are a couple of commands that don't have the proper blocks. If you are at one of those commands, reach out to us ASAP.

Operationalizing Safety in High-Risk Environments: Lessons from the Edge

By Dr. David Copeman – Director, Expeditionary & Special Warfare Safety Programs

Whether conducting combat dive operations, executing a nighttime Military Freefall or managing high-risk training, the Department of War's approach to these inherently dangerous activities perfectly illustrates the core tenets of the Navy Risk Control System/Safety Management System (RCS/SMS). High-risk training does not succeed by hoping for good conditions; it succeeds through the rigorous, proactive application of Risk Control and strict adherence to policy (such as OPNAVINST 1500.75D).

Just as a Dive Supervisor conducts an uncompromising physical inspection before anyone enters the water, the Navy RCS/SMS requires commands to systematically identify hazards, assess risks and implement controls — like vetting for cadre or the mandatory presence of a safety diver. By viewing every pre-dive rehearsal, equipment check and safety brief not as an administrative burden but as an essential element of Safety Assurance, we ensure our personnel can push the limits of human performance while maintaining the highest levels of combat readiness and risk management.

Master Diver's Corner

By NDCM(DWS/SG/SW/IW/AW) K. Ryan Ilagan

Safety is not a static goal, it is a continuous process of identifying risks, analyzing trends and implementing corrective actions. The discrepancies identified in the calendar year (CY) 2025 dataset of Diving Safety Assessments (DSA) provide valuable insight into areas where safety practices may be breaking down. By examining these discrepancies, organizations can move beyond reactive responses and adopt a proactive safety culture that prevents incidents before they occur.

Overview of Discrepency Data

The dataset reflects a total of 206 discrepancies distributed across numerous codes representing different functional or operational areas. While many categories show only isolated occurrences, several stand out due to higher frequency. The main code types are explained as follows:

- MD09 and RC30 reflect similar issues (expired medical items) in different sections (Medical and Recompression Chamber) and, when combined, add up to 11 total discrepancies (5.34% of all discrepancies)
- SC25 (expired Periodic Health Assessments (PHA)) equals nine discrepancies (4.37%)
- AD17 (Tag-out issues) equals eight discrepancies (3.88%)
- SC13 (buoyancy compensator maintenance) equals six discrepancies (2.91%)
- CP03 (filter housing tested/tagged) equals six discrepancies (2.91%)
- CP04 (moisture separator inspected/tagged) equals six discrepancies (2.91%)
- ORM05 (ORM training completion) equals five discrepancies (2.43%)
- HAZ09 (fire extinguisher inspection) equals five discrepancies (2.43%)

These higher-frequency categories represent the most significant contributors to overall safety risk and should be prioritized for corrective action.

Key Line Item Discrepancies Identified

1. Concentration of Risk in Specific Categories

A small number of discrepancy codes account for a disproportionate share of total issues. This suggests systemic weaknesses rather than isolated mistakes. For example, repeated discrepancies in SC (SCUBA) and AD (administrative) categories may indicate gaps in the four principles of the Safety Management System (SMS): "safe place," "safe people," "safe property/materiel" and "safe processes/ procedures."

2. Administrative Breakdown

Codes such as AD17 (Tag-Out issue) highlight administrative deficiencies:

AD17: *"Is a tag-out log utilized for diving equipment and systems? Is a copy of the Tag-Out User's Manual available and are audits being conducted bi-weekly?"*

The main issue boils down to audits were not being conducted at the required frequency. There were also a few tag-out violations in the past year which were corrected immediately. However, these violations are categorized as Significant Discrepancies and carry greater weight on the overall DSA score.

3. Operational and Compliance Issues

Common SCUBA-related discrepancies include:

SC25: *"Is maintenance properly scheduled in SKED or tracked on a separate document (e.g., Excel spreadsheet, status board)?"*

Issues include Planned Maintenance System (PMS) discrepancies where anchor dates do not match objective quality evidence (OQE).

SC13: *"Is maintenance conducted on life preservers*



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RMI Help Desk: 866-210-7474

Master Diver's Corner (cont.)

and buoyancy compensators and are they in good condition?"

Issues include missing or damaged grommets and the presence of saltwater in buoyancy compensators (BCs).

SC03: *"Are SCUBA cylinder manifold valves and rupture discs properly matched to cylinder working pressure to ensure the rupture disc (blowout plug) is the weakest point in the system?"*

Mismatched burst discs continue to be identified. These issues indicate failures to adhere to safety protocols, improper equipment maintenance or lapses in inspections. Repetition suggests existing controls are either insufficient or inconsistently enforced.

4. Medical Deficiencies

Codes such as MD09 and RC30 address similar issues and, when combined, equal 11 discrepancies. This is the highest number for CY25**:** *"Are all applicable consumables and/or drugs in medical kits in satisfactory condition and within expiration dates?"*

The primary issue is expired medical supplies with no clear replacement plan. A proactive approach is needed to track and replace items before expiration.

5. Hazardous material (HAZ) and Operational Risk Management (ORM) Gaps

Discrepancies in HAZ09 and ORM05 indicate shortcomings in hazard recognition and risk management:

HAZ09: *"Are portable fire extinguisher inspections conducted and documented per references?"*

Issues include PMS tracking errors and unclear responsibility between commands and facilities. Inspections may have been completed but tags were not properly filled out per PMS requirements.

ORM05: *"Have all personnel completed required training based on their level of responsibility in the command's ORM program?"*

At least one individual in each case had not completed required training. These gaps suggest personnel may not be fully equipped to identify or mitigate risks effectively.

Significant Discrepancies identified (since January 2026)

CP-24: *"Is any equipment that is out of commission, out of maintenance periodicity, or otherwise unsafe, tagged out to prevent use?"*

Tag-out violation: The compressor was secured and tagged out for maintenance; all documentation and tags were filled out correctly, and the tag was hung properly. Yet the compressor remained on, with full power, ready to be used.

MK13: *"Is a PMS program implemented for all diving and diving support equipment? If not, has a feedback report been submitted for all equipment not covered?"*

Improper MK-20 underwater breathing apparatus (UBA) pre-dive maintenance. Not only was pre-dive maintenance incomplete and not logged on the Operation Procedures, but the screws securing the low-volume MK20 visor were fully backed out. This UBA was set up ready for diving operations.

AS24: *"Is the umbilical assembled so the strength member always carries the full strain of the umbilical?"*

Improper seizing of a diving umbilical. Two umbilicals were found with the D-ring not seized appropriately per the U.S. Navy Umbilical Manual. These umbilicals would not have carried the weight of a diver in an emergency, as evidenced by the D-ring and seizing being easily moved by hand. Additionally, these umbilicals were ready for use during diving operations.

SC13: *"Is maintenance conducted on life preservers and buoyancy compensators? Are they in good condition and operating as designed?"*

Half of the dive team's Zeagle BCs' cummerbund Velcro stitching was undone leaving a sizable gap between the Velcro and the cummerbund. These BCs were recently used for diving, and pre-dive maintenance was overlooked.

Recommendations for Improvement

1. Target High-Frequency Discrepancies

Focus corrective actions on top contributors (e.g., SC25 (match anchor dates with OQE), AD17 (conduct tag-out audits)). Perform root cause analyses to determine whether issues stem from training gaps, unclear procedures or insufficient supervision.

2. Strengthen Training Programs

Recurring discrepancies often indicate personnel either do not understand requirements or are not retaining critical information. Tailored training, particularly in compliance, maintenance, and risk management, can significantly reduce repeat issues.

3. Enhance Oversight and Accountability

Supervisory engagement is critical. Leaders should routinely review discrepancy trends, conduct spot checks and ensure corrective actions are implemented effectively.

4. Improve Documentation and Processes

Administrative discrepancies can be reduced by simplifying processes, standardizing documentation and leveraging digital tools to minimize human error.

Conclusion

The CY 2025 DSA discrepancy data provide more than a list of issues; they offer a roadmap for improving safety. By focusing on high-frequency discrepancies, addressing systemic weaknesses and fostering a proactive culture of safety, organizations can significantly reduce risk.

Safety is ultimately a shared responsibility. When discrepancies are treated not as failures but as opportunities for improvement, they become powerful tools for building a safer and more resilient organization.

Consolidated Diving Safety Assessment Results

ADMINISTRATION

AD01

The command diving instruction was missing guidance for Commander's Critical Information Requirements and breath hold dives as required by OPNAVINST 3150.27D.

AD04

There is no effective means of ensuring divers stay up to date with the latest Diving Advisories. Most recent available was from 2022.

AD05

There is no effective means of ensuring divers stay up to date with the latest Diving Safety Lines. Most recent available was from 2018.

AD12

All divers did not conduct the required eight dives annually.

AD17

Tag-out entry log listed incorrect number of tags for an active Tag-Out Record Sheet.

Numerous tag-out violations to include missing signatures on the tag-out record sheet and missing signatures on the red tags for second person verification.

AD19

Local Re-Entry Control procedures are out of date.

AIR SYSTEMS & STOWAGE

AS02

Command was missing second Operator signature and Diving Supervisor signatures on completed Operating Procedure.

AS05

FADS III had interconnecting air system hoses that were single bagged with foreign material exclusion (FME) covers. The FME covers were torn exposing the ends of the hoses. The hose end that was exposed contained verdigris.

AS09

FADS III was missing the required system safety air supply tags.

AS22

FADS III umbilicals were missing the required pnemofathometer hydrostatic test tags.

AS23

Umbilical did not have a proper FME cover on the end of the umbilical to prevent contamination.

AS30

High pressure oxygen hose on the Oxygen Regulator Control Assembly had the outer protective covering chafed through to inner hose.

AS35

Spare relief valves were not listed in SKED.

ADS III components were not listed as individual line items in SKED.

COMPRESSOR

CP02

Air sample was not documented in SKED or the unit's external maintenance tracker.

CP02

Bauer compressors had multiple SKED errors with incorrect anchor dates across multiple applicable PMS requirements.

CP03

Bauer compressors' filter housings were missing the required tag information IAW the MRC.

CP04

Bauer compressor's moisture separators were missing the required tag information IAW the MRC.

CP05

All logbooks assessed were missing various required data (missing start/stop, corrective maintenance completed and pressures out of parameters).

The compressor logbook was missing the required corrective or preventive maintenance accomplished, component being charged, and pressures out of parameters entries.

CP06

Bauer compressor air samples were not tracked for completion in SKED work center and were overdue. The command's most recent air sample failed air purity standards.

CP07

Gauges on the Bauer compressor had conflicting data between the sticker, SKED and OQE. The OQE was off by one year compared to the information in SKED and on the sticker. The gauges on Bauer Capitano compressors 2071 and 2073 were calibrated at 24 months instead of the required 18-month intervals.

CP08

All relief valves on five Bauer compressors were expired.

CP10

The operating procedures (OP) and emergency procedures EP for the command's five compressors were not available.

CP11

The OPs for the command's five compressors were not posted.

CP18

The unit had one charging whip with loose whipping on the strain relief.

CP20

Bauer compressor had a pool of oily residue under the electric motor.

CP26

Compressor gauge anchored in SKED for December 2023. The calibration date on the gauge is September 2023.

DIVE BOAT

DB19

Maintenance check 120M-1 Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) was not completed.

DIVE PANEL (DP) 2

DP08

The calibration sticker on the unit's portable pressure gauge was incorrectly labeled to expire at 24 months instead of 18 months.

DP25

The unit had two buoyancy compensators with fresh water in the bladders.

DP29

Work center used the 18M-5R in SKED for comparative accuracy on the pressure gauge. The correct maintenance check listed should be the 18M-2R.

Consolidated Diving Safety Assessment Results (cont.)

HAZMAT

HAZ10

Eyewash station has not been inspected since 2022.

KM97

SS30

Four torque wrenches had expired calibration.

SS13

One KM 97 neck dam had six small holes in the neoprene.

SS02

Checklists required for preoperational checks on the KM 97 were not properly filled out.

MEDICAL

MD01

The unit had two divers with expired diving physicals.

MD02

The unit had one diver with a pending waiver.

MD12

Quarterly maintenance check on the O2 cylinder was not documented on the control tag or SKED. The last documented recording was 2022

MD14

Backboard had a broken buckle.

MD09

Expired consumables and medicines found in two first aid kits.

MD08

Epinephrine and Diphenhydramine found in the first aid kit were expired.

MK25

MK2537

Loose whipping on the charging whip from the electric booster pump to the charging station.

ORM

ORM03

The designated senior enlisted ORM assistant had not attended the required training for the position.

ORM02

Command did not have a senior enlisted ORM assistant designated in writing.

RECOMPRESSION CHAMBER

RC02

Chamber logbook was missing multiple signatures from the Master Diver and/or the Diving Officer.

RC30

Expired consumables were found in medical kits.

RC31

No quarterly inventories were documented in SKED since 2022.

RC39

The components of three recompression chambers were not listed or tracked in SKED properly.

RC38

Built-in Breathing System situational requirements were not documented for three recompression chambers in SKED.

RC25

Sound-powered phone was inoperable.

RC28

Face of gauge had several cracks.

Chamber Air and Oxygen Supply hose improperly connected causing an abrasion through the outer shell of the hose.

SCUBA

SC03

One set of twin 3000 psi SCUBA cylinders had a 5500 psi blowout discs installed. Maximum allowable blowout disc for 3000 psi cylinders is 5000 psi. Three sets of twin 3442 psi SCUBA cylinders had the incorrect blowout discs installed. The maximum blowout disc for the 3442 psi SCUBA bottle is 5150 psi. The command had 5500 psi blowout discs installed.

SC10

The SCUBA regulator set's low-pressure buoyancy compensator inflation hose was kinked.

SC13

Three buoyancy compensators had saltwater in the bladders.

SC22

Pressure pot was stored with the bayonet off, missing a gauge, missing a relief valve, and found to contain debris. Command stated pressure pot was in IEM but it was not.

SC25

The regulator sets, which contain two second stage regulators, are listed on one single line item in SKED work center. This setup only allows tracking of maintenance for one of the two regulators.

All gauges, relief valves, flasks, filters, SCUBA regulators, SCUBA cylinders and hoses were not identified or tracked in SKED on single line items.

SC26

Dates for submersible gauges were incorrectly anchored seven months late in SKED.

SCUBA cylinder hydrostatic test dates were anchored late in SKED.

TRAINING

TRA07

No long or short range training plan in place.

TRA08

No diver's training plan in place.

TRA09

No HAZMAT training conducted.

TRA11

Diving Officer was the only diver signing the training attendance records.

No records of attendance kept for completed training.

UNDERWATER CUTTING & WELDING

UCW19

A-2R on welder was overdue by eight months.



Want more?

Check out our resources and publications: ***Approach*, MECH, *Ground Warrior*** magazines, surface and aviation safety newsletters, Safety Awareness products and more!

Naval Safety Command, located on Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, provides resources and guidance to develop a Navy safety culture in which everyone is trained and motivated to manage risk and ensure the combat readiness of our forces and the Navy's global warfighting capabilities.

We provide policy, doctrine and guidance, safety surveys and assessment visits, training and education, multimedia products, marketing and outreach campaigns, and recognition and awards programs.

Our products, current and archived, can be found at https://www.navalsafetycommand.navy.mil.

Check Out Our Current Safety Publications

Find our latest issues of ***Approach*, MECH and *Ground Warrior.*** Our family of publications is available online at https://navalsafetycommand.navy.mil/Media/Mags-Pubs/.

The editorial staff is always looking for contributing writers. We want to publish your articles and stories that increase operational readiness, evaluate safety and health issues, correct deficiencies, and emphasize situational awareness.

Feedback or ideas for the next DIVING Safety newsletter issue?

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